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FROM DISCRETIONARY TO BUREAUCRATIC 
JUSTICE 
Barry Boyer* 
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CLAIMS. By Jerry L. Mashaw. New Haven and London: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 1983. Pp. x, 238. $25. 
Bureaucratic Justice is a quietly subversive book that challenges 
the legal profession's conventional wisdom on several levels. At a 
time when commentators of all political persuasions dismiss bureau-
cratic expertise as a myth and despair of the possibility of neutral 
administration, Professor Mashaw assures us that rational, benevo-
lent expertise is alive and well and living in the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA). This expertise, he argues, produces mass justice 
that is neither inferior nor subordinate to the brand of justice dis-
pensed by the courts. Rather, SSA can serve as a model for other 
bureaucracies - if only the courts and lawyers can refrain from 
their clumsy tinkering with the system. 
Readers who have followed Professor Mashaw's earlier writings 
on the Social Security system, such as How Much of What Qua!ity 1 
and The Management Side of .Due Process,2 will find much that is 
familiar in Bureaucratic Justice. In this book, however, Mashaw's 
numerous valuable insights into the functioning of the massive SSA 
bureaucracy have been synthesized and generalized into a unified 
vision of justice in the modem regulatory state. 
The heart of this vision consists of three conceptual models of 
administrative justice which are "distinct" and "highly competitive" 
(p. 23). The first model, and the one most fully· developed in the 
SSA, is Bureaucratic Rationality. This form of justice seeks to guar-
antee that individual bureaucratic decisions will be "accurate and 
efficient concrete realizations of the legislative will" (p. 25). In the 
SSA, Bureaucratic Rationality frequently comes into conflict with a 
second model of justice, Professional Treatment, which is associated 
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primarily with the doctors and vocational rehabilitation specialists 
who are involved in disability determinations. These helping profes-
sions understand the goal of justice to be assuring that decisions 
"provide appropriate support or therapy from the perspective of rel-
evant professional cultures" (p. 25). Both the Bureaucratic Rational-
ity and the Professional Treatment models may, in tum, conflict with 
the Moral Judgment model of justice favored by the legal profession. 
The overriding objective of this ideal of justice is to assure that deci-
sions are "fairly arrived at when assessed in the light of traditional 
processes for determining individual entitlements" (p. 25) - a goal 
that echoes some of the rhetoric of the procedural due process cases.3 
In assessing the traditional legal view of administrative justice, 
Mashaw is careful to distinguish between "external" administrative 
law - that which is codified in statutes like the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act4 or is imposed on the agency by reviewing courts - and 
the "internal" administrative law that results from the influence of 
legally trained insiders like the administrative law judges who decide 
disability appeals. Mashaw has nothing but contempt for external 
administrative law, dismissing it as a "history of failed ideas" that 
"oscillate[s] continuously between irrelevance and impertinence" (p. 
1). The external legal system proceeds from an inadequate under-
standing of the phenomena it seeks to control, uses an inappropriate 
array of techniques to alter bureaucratic behavior, and examines 
only a small, unrepresentative sample of the relevant agency deci-
sions. Even the landmark judicial review decisions are fatally flawed. 
Thus, in Goldberg v. Ke!!y5 the Supreme Court "misunderstood 
what caused decisional errors and vastly overestimated the capacity 
of welfare bureaucracies to run a hearing system" (p. 4), and Overton 
Park6 was based upon "an atrociously simpleminded interpretation" 
of the relevant statutes (p. 4, footnotes omitted). While these incom-
petencies of the courts are rehearsed at some length, Mashaw makes 
clear that any outside entity attempting to control the details of ad-
ministration in a vast bureaucracy like SSA will be comparably im-
potent. For better or worse, "the task of improving the quality of 
administrative justice is one that must be carried forward primarily 
by administrators. The task is too complex for the nonexpert, too 
time and resource consuming for outside institutions with competing 
interests" (p. 15). The fundamental question, then, is how a bureau-
cracy like SSA , largely insulated from e.ff ective oversight, will recon-
cile the competing models of justice within itself. 
3. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970). 
4. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 7521 (1976). 
5. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
6. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
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The bulk of Bureaucratic Justice is devoted to answering that 
question by tracing through the conflicting values and bureaucratic 
imperatives surrounding disability decisions. This analysis, which 
manages to be both conceptually sophisticated and empirically con-
vincing, resists easy summary; the tone of it is captured by one of 
Mashaw's subtitles, "Searching for the Good Within the Constraints 
of the Possible" (p. 47). In the end, SSA's "tilt" toward bureaucratic 
rationality, and its heroic attempts to impose hierarchical controls 
despite "the intractability of diverse human materials" (p. 167), earn 
high marks on the scale of justice. To be sure, Mashaw offer& several 
suggestions for improving the system, but these are modest incre-
mental proposals, such as providing face-to-face contact between bu-
reaucrats and clients (pp. 198-99) or establishing a corps of lay 
advocates to represent claimants (pp. 200-02). On the whole, "SSA 
has succeeded remarkably well in embracing both the neutrality, ex-
pertise, and efficiency that are the promise of bureaucracy and the 
concern for individual circumstances and well-being that is promised 
by [models of justice based on] moral entitlements and professional 
treatment" (p. 214). 
A curious omission in Bureaucratic Justice is Mashaw's failure to 
mention the book that has been most influential in shaping contem-
porary legal thought on the problem of mass justice in the welfare 
state: Kenneth Culp Davis's Discretionary Justice. 7 A brief compari-
son of the premises underlying these two books illustrates some of 
the changes in thinking about law and bureaucracy during the past 
fifteen years and also highlights the problems of defending the legiti-
macy of the regulatory state. 
Davis's well-known view that administrative discretion often un-
dermines fair administration and should be more strictly controlled 
was based upon a straightforward definition of justice. ''The central 
question about justice is this," wrote Davis: "If A and B are equally 
deserving of prosecution, or if A is more deserving of prosecution 
than B, is a decision to prosecute B but not A unjust?"8 Even in the 
7. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). In general, the 
footnoting of Bureaucratic Justice is spotty and the absence of a bibliography or table of refer-
ences is an unnecessary handicap for the reader who is not intimately familiar with the litera-
ture Mashaw is synthesizing. In addition, the book probably owes an unacknowledged 
intellectual debt to prior social science work in the field. One apparently uncited study that 
comes to mind is Joel Handler's PROTECTING THE SOCIAL SERVICES CLIENT (1979), which 
makes a powerful case for the irrelevance and impotence of what Mashaw calls "external 
administrative law." 
8. K. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 167. Though much of his discussion was devoted to police 
and prosecutorial discretion, Davis nonetheless made clear that welfare agencies like SSA also 
posed problems of discretionary justice. See, e.g., id at 7-8: · 
Some of our most important agencies are no more striving to achieve policy goals than are 
the courts; their prime focus and even their almost exclusive focus may be the administra-
tion of justice. Take, for instance, the Social Security Administration in its adjudication 
of claims. The answers are highly crystallized for old age and survivors claims, and com-
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context of prosecutorial discretion, which was the primary focus of 
.Discretionary Justice ,9 the answer to this question may not be as self-
evident today as it was when Davis wrote it. As lawyers and social 
scientists have looked more carefully at the process of regulatory en-
forcement, it has become increasingly evident that the phrase 
"equally deserving" covers a multitude of difficult questions. Is it 
just for a regulatory enforcement officer to cite company A for a pol-
lution control violation but to give company B more time for compli-
ance because he believes that company B will have serious financial 
problems in abating its discharges?I0 What if A and Bare illegally 
discharging the same toxic effluents, but B cannot install the neces-
sary control equipment because its plant site is too crowded? Is it 
consistent with the notion of justice for an inspector to "bluff' a vio-
lator by threatening criminal prosecution, in a situation where the 
inspector knows that the penalty is trivial but the violator does not? 
Does an agency perpetrate an injustice if it seeks to induce compli-
ance by getting the violator in trouble with another agency - for 
example, by opposing its pending license application? The concept 
of "equally deserving" provides at best limited guidance in resolving 
these morally debatable issues. I I 
Mashaw is sensitive to "the ambiguity and incoherence of the 
goals of the disability benefits program" he is analyzing (p. 52), and 
to the problems this poses for a concept of justice based on bureau-
puters do most of the work; ... significant policy questions still arise and probably al-
ways will, but they are highly exceptional. The difficulties are in disability claims, which 
are often controversial .... Far from being a crusader for expanding social welfare, the 
Administration is trying to follow the intent of Congress as expressed in the statute and its 
legislative history, and the Administration is in general much less liberal to claimants than 
are the reviewing courts . . . . The task of the Administration is basically one of adminis-
trative justice, not one of formulating general policies in some legislatively-designated 
direction. 
9. Id Davis sought to distinguish prosecutorial or case handling discretion - which 
posed problems of legal justice - from policymaking, which posed problems of social justice. 
Thus, he argues: 
The major decisions reached in the White House are all discretionary but seldom involve 
discretionary justice - foreign policy, military policy, domestic policy in programs 
planned for congressional enactment. Such policies may contain ingredients of what we 
call social justice, but such policies seldom include determinations of rights of individual 
parties. 
Id at 6. 
10. The examples are suggested by Keith Hawkins' participant-observation study of water 
pollution control enforcement in England. See Hawkins, Bargain and Bluffi Compliance Strat-
egy and .Deterrence in the Eeforcement of Regulation, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 35 (1983), 
11. For example, there is at present a lively debate in the journals over Professor Peter 
Westen's assertion that the notion of equality is an "empty" and "confusing" concept that 
takes its meaning only from normative standards that logically precede it. See Westen, The 
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982); Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas'!· 
Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. I 136 (1982); Westen, On "Con-
fusing Ideas'~· A Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982); Chemerinsky, In .Defense of Equality: A 
Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 515 (1983); D' Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty 
Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 600 (1983); Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, 
and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983). 
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cratic rationality. In theory, "[a] pure model of instrumental ration-
ality must presume that the values or reference goals for 
decisionmaking are absolute (that is, that the choice of one goal over 
another is not morally distressing), relevant, stable, consistent, pre-
cise, and exogenous . . ." (p. 52). But these conditions never apply 
in the real world, and so the agency is forced to define its means as 
well as its ends in the process of implementation. This is not to say, 
however, that bureaucratic rationality is unattainable or irrelevant 
whenever underlying policy goals conflict. "The managerial task," 
Mashaw concludes, "is to recognize emerging values or disvalues 
and to act to reinforce acceptable behavior while deterring the unac-
ceptable. . . . [O]ne can certainly be critical of a system that fails to 
use hindsight to improve its administration" (p. 61 ). 
Davis and Mashaw also differ in theu- assessments of the tech-
niques that agencies can use to control discretion. Davis defines 
three methods that can be used to limit the discretion of low-level 
decisionmakers such as SSA disability examiners: confining discre-
tion by substantive standards, usually administrative rules and prin-
ciples promulgated by the agency; structuring discretion through 
openness and fair procedure; and checking discretion through review 
by higher officials.12 For the most part, these techniques are expli-
cated by normative argument and negative example rather than by 
systematic exploration of how they might function together within a 
single agency. 13 Mashaw's study has the advantage of a narrower 
focus on a single agency, as well as the empirical sensitivity that 
comes from prolonged exposure to the day-to-day workings of a bu-
reaucracy. As a result, it paints a picture that is both more convinc-
ing in its detail and more disquieting in its implications. 
Where Davis seemed to suggest that the control techniques could 
be easily implemented and would mutually reinforce each other, 
Mashaw's analysis tends to reject both of these assumptions. Assur-
ing some minimal degree of consistency in claims adjudications is, as 
he describes it, an enormously difficult task that involves not only 
the legalistic approach of codifying decisional rules, but also the 
managerial problems of developing and implementing a quality con-
trol system for the decisionmaking process (pp. 149-54) and "engi-
neering an adjudicatory culture" to produce the desired results (pp. 
155-68). These various management techniques can easily contra-
dict or undermine each other in ways that are difficult to foresee. 
Thus, a quality assurance project intended to correct the overly lib-
12. K. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 52-58, 97-98, 142-46. 
13. This observation is not intended as a criticism of Professor Davis, for two reasons. 
First, .Discretionary Justice was not written as an empirical work, but rather (as the subtitle 
indicates) as a "preliminary inquiry" at the theoretical level into the general problems of infor-
mal administrative action. Moreover, there was relatively little useful empirical data in the 
literature when Davis wrote his book. 
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eral interpretation of disability criteria in some state agencies pro-
duced the opposite excess, as disability examiners interpreted the 
reversals as a signal to run all of the presumptions against the claim-
ant (pp. 159-60). Moreover, because the disability program is based 
on a concept of "cooperative federalism" in which state agencies 
make initial decisions subject to the review and oversight of SSA, the 
federal overseers do not enjoy the full range of normal management 
powers: 
SSA can attempt to elicit appropriate conduct by refining its instruc-
tions, by calling conferences between state agency heads and regional 
and central office personnel, and by processing routine [quality assur-
ance] returns. But these informational devices . . . may have little or 
no effect. On the other hand, SSA can conduct an intensive review of 
some aspect of claims processsing, backed by the implicit threat of re-
placing the state agency for poor performance . . . What the SSA can-
not do is make midrange management moves that would reinforce . . . 
an appropriate adjudicatory culture - selection, training, assignment, 
and promotion of personnel. ... [P. 160]. 
In this complex world of contending forces and contingent powers, 
SSA's leadership can at best nudge and prod the recalcitrant 
bureaucracy, hoping that it will move a little way in the desired di-
rection. From this perspective, Davis' image of the all-powerful su-
pervisor checking and confining his subordinates' discretion must 
appear to be an impossible dream. 
Mashaw's world of bureaucracy is thus a more ambiguous and 
realistic place than Davis' neat world of rules and standards, but 
Mashaw's sensitivity to the complexities of value and power conflicts 
leaves the reader with some uneasy feelings about the political legiti-
macy of the administrative agency. Mashaw gives some lip service 
to the traditional rationalization of the administrative agency as the 
mere instrument of legislative will, 14 but also frankly acknowledges 
the limits of that will. In a section appropriately titled, "Does Any-
one Know What this Program is About?" (pp. 52-61 ), he catalogues 
some of the conflicting imperatives in the congressional mandate and 
concludes: "[T]he line that Congress drew through the ability -
disability continuum when establishing its eligibility standard cannot 
be precisely located" (p. 56). For much the same reason, judicial 
review leaves the agency "a gigantic policy space, invisible to the 
legal order because devoid of justiciable rights" (p. 9). Congress 
might fill this gap through its powers to supervise administration, but 
here, too, the signals are mixed: "In ·oversight, budget, and legisla-
tive hearings, Congress has alternately berated SSA for its unrespon-
14. Thus, on page 25 Mashaw states: "Given the democratically (legislatively) approved 
task - to pay disability benefits to eligible persons - the administrative goal in the ideal 
conception of bureaucratic rationality is to develop, at the least possible cost, a system for 
distinguishing between true and false claims." 
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siveness to claimants and for its laxity in letting them on the rolls" 
(p. 20). Casework - the congressional handling of constituents' 
complaints about agency performance - serves mainly to frustrate 
the ideal of equal justice by forcing SSA to give some cases preferen-
tial treatment (p. 71). 
The process of trying to reconcile these incommensurable values 
can be made to seem relatively systematic, as Mashaw does when he 
suggests that there may be a "Pareto optimality" of values: 
Such an evaluation [ of SSA decisionmaking] asks how the decision 
structure as a whole, fosters or retards the realization of multiple val-
ues - values that, given our broad definition of efficiency, might be 
restated as involving rationality, efficiency, and process fairness. 
Changes that unambiguously increase the system's capacity to realize 
one or more of these values without sacrificing others are obviously 
desirable. Beyond these easy cases (should any exist), evaluative anal-
ysis can only weigh as carefully as possible the trade-offs among goals 
that are inherent in current processes or in prop~sals for reform. [P. 
103]. 
Economic jargon aside, it seems doubtful that this sort of analysis 
can become much more systematic or objective than the loose inter-
est-balancing traditionally used by the courts. As any law student 
can testify, interest balancing is a game in which the outcome de-
pends very heavily on who is doing the balancing, and what values 
are allowed onto the scales - in short, on the balancer's ideology 
and social position. The question then arises: does .Bureaucratic Jus-
tice provide anything more than Professor Mashaw's ideology - or, 
perhaps, the ideology of high-level SSA bureaucrats filtered through 
Mashaw? 
The book attempts to deal with this problem in several ways. 
First, the three models of justice are empirically derived, at least in a 
loose anecdotal sense. Mashaw makes clear that his models repre-
sent attempts to synthesize strands in the critical literature (pp. 21-
23), and he defines justice as "those qualities of a decision process 
that provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions" (pp. 24-
25). A second quasi-empirical approach to defining and weighing 
the interests is mentioned in Mashaw's discussion of the importance 
of error reduction as a system goal. "My reading of the history of 
the disability program, analysis of its procedural and evidentiary 
rules, and observations of its operations," he concludes, "reveal no 
strong reasons to believe that either type of error [that is, a wrongful 
grant or a wrongful denial of benefits] should be viewed as systemat-
ically more costly than the other. Caution and benevolence have, so 
far as I can tell, equal status" (p. 85). Building on this insight, 
Mashaw constructs a hypothetical "social benefits curve" to repre-
sent the societal costs of making different types of errors. The theo-
retical basis of this curve is an imaginary "perfect plebiscite in which 
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voters assign 'deservingness' numbers . . . to well-de.fined clusters of 
. . . personal characteristics" defining eligibility, and then "indicate 
the intensity of their joy or unhappiness at the prospect of a public 
transfer of a specified size being made to a person occupying deter-
minate places" on the eligibility continuum (pp. 3-4 n.5). The con-
clusion is that because the social benefits curve is evenly sloped 
above and below the eligibility continuum, SSA need not be any 
more concerned about erroneous denials than about erroneous 
grants. 15 
The difficulty with these approaches to defining and weighing in-
terests is that they may well overstate the degree of consensus within 
the society, and thereby unnecessarily constrict debate over the 
meaning of justice in the modern welfare state. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by reference to one strand of critical literature that 
Mashaw apparently omits from his synthesis, the radical left critique 
of Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward.16 According to 
Piven and Cloward, the fundamental clash of values in welfare sys-
tems like SSA disability is not between benevolence and fiscal cau-
tion, but rather between repression of the poor and fear that they 
will revolt and disrupt the civil order: 
Administrative obstacles [to obtaining relief] reinforce legal exclusions 
in ensuring that those who are or might be workers do not get aid. 
Harsh relief practices serve to enforce work in another way as well. 
Some few of the very young, the old, or the disabled are allowed on the 
rolls even during the periods of political stability. But once there, they 
are systematically punished and degraded, made into object lessons for 
other poor people to observe and shun, their own station raised by con-
trast. . . . The exigencies of their political environment force relief of-
ficials to design procedures that serve the economic ends of groups 
outside of the relief system.17 
In this bleak vision of the welfare system, the legislative and admin-
istrative history of a program like SSA disability would be inter-
preted much differently - perhaps as a cynical veneer of 
respectability for the system's repressive purpose, or as a kind of 
false consciousness - and the slope of the social benefits curve 
would be sharply skewed, depending on how one imagined the out-
come of the hypothetical perfect plebiscite. Strategies for reform 
15. Mashaw uses the following hypothetical to illustrate the differing error costs of cases 
that are factually clear, and those that are factually problematic: 
(A] decision classifying a decathlon gold medalist as disabled or a patient in a quasi-
vegetative state as not disabled seems somehow a bigger, more costly error than the poten-
tially erroneous assignment of the perennial marginal case (say a fifty-five-year-old, semi-
skilled white male with high blood pressure and chronic lower back syndrome) to either 
category. 
P. 82. 
16. F. PlVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE PooR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WEL· 
FARE (1971). 
17. Id. at 147. 
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would surely be much more radical than the incremental adjust-
ments proposed in Bureaucratic Justice .18 
The fragility of Mashaw's social consensus assumptions can also 
be illustrated at the opposite end of the political spectrum, by noting 
the recent controversies inspired by Reagan appointees James Watt 
and Anne Gorsuch Burford in the field of environmental protection. 
Given this experience, it is perhaps not unrealistic to hypothesize the 
appointment of a leadership cadre at SSA who believed that ninety-
five percent of all disability benefit claimants were goldbricking chis-
elers bent on raiding the federal treasury, and who defined their mis-
sion as cutting the disability rolls by at least two-thirds. This tilt 
toward fiscal "caution," if one could call it that, would surely fall 
outside the legislative and critical consensus that Mashaw defines, 
and would undoubtedly produce a more overt guerilla warfare be-
tween political appointees and career bureaucrats than Mashaw 
found at SSA. Would this situation still fit the model of justice 
through bureaucratic rationality that Mashaw defines? More 
broadly, what happens to the search for justice when the various em-
pirical bases for defining agency goals pull in opposite directions, 
and signal the presence of bitter social conflict rather than broad 
consensus? Can we still be content with the bureaucracy's self-defi-
nition of its mission, knowing that the formal constraints and incen-
tives that bind them are so tenuous? 
This is not to suggest that any of the critics of the far left or right 
necessarily have a more correct understanding of the "true" nature 
of the SSA disability system than Mashaw, or a superior ideal of 
justice. But it does seem that attempts to separate bureaucratic or 
legal concepts of justice from the broader problem of social justice 
will often be futile. As Richard Stewart has noted, "in the absence 
of authoritative rules of decision, the resolution of the conflicting 
claims of a large number of competing interests is essentially a polit-
ical process . . . ."19 Agencies like SSA may try to resolve those 
conflicts in a rational, expert, and nonpartisan fashion, but this may 
just mask rather than alter the political character of the questions 
18. See, e.g., F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUC-
CEED, How THEY FAIL 275-76 (1977): 
In 1965 we had completed research showing that for every family on the AFDC rolls, at 
least one other was eligible but unaided . . • . If hundreds of thousands of families could 
be induced to demand relief, we thought that two gains might result. First, if large num-
bers of people succeeded in getting on the rolls, much of the worst of America's poverty 
would be eliminated. Second, . . . we thought it likely that a huge increase in the relief 
rolls would set off fiscal and political crises in the cities, the reverberations of which might 
lead national political leaders to federalize the relief system and establish a national mini-
mum income standard. 
19. Stewart, The Reformation ef American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 
1790 (1975). 
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they are addressing. We cannot afford to become too complacent 
about the control and accountability of our public bureaucracies. 
If Bureaucratic Justice can be faulted for failing to look beyond 
the comfortable tenets of centrist politics in its definitions of justice, 
it nonetheless is an exceptionally valuable book for anyone who is 
concerned about the role of law in the administrative state. Mashaw 
manages to range broadly without becoming superficial, and to pr~s-
ent a coherent and challenging theory in lively, readable prose. Bu-
reaucratic Justice seems certain to become a standard reference work 
for administrative lawyers, and for anyone else who seeks the elusive 
goal of developing more humane and more effective public 
bureaucracies. 
